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COMMENTS AT 1997 AALS ANNUAL MEETING:
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
JAMES J. WHITE*
As Jean [Braucher]' said, I have served on several committees in
connection with the revisions of Articles 2, 2A, and 5. I am now on a
committee of uncertain obligation that is going to review the NCCUSL draft
of Article 2 for the American Law Institute. I was the reporter-an awful
task, if anybody ever asks you to do that, you should think about it once or
twice-for Article 5. I think service as the reporter for Article 2 might kill
Dick Speidel by the time he is done.
I want to talk about the revision process. My comments are based on my
anecdotal observation; I focus on Articles 2 and 9. It is unclear to me whether
the NCCUSL process is up to the task of revising Articles 2 and 9 right now.
Let me explain. First, there is no broad agreement, no consensus, among
the interested parties about the fairness or the efficiency of the "consumer
protection" rules. On the one hand, you have people, including a number of
people at this table (everybody at this table except for me, I suspect), who
honestly and truly believe in and who persuasively argue on behalf of various
"consumer protection" provisions. At the base level, consumer advocates
would say that the consumer proposals for Articles 2 and 9 are fair and that
we are obliged to have law that is fair. Secondly, I suspect that they would
argue that these consumer protection rules are efficient. Even if these rules
cost consumers money in the form of higher fees, they are efficient because,
given the choice, consumers would pay for those consumer rights as a form of
insurance against unfair treatment on default. Therefore-according to the
consumer advocates-the law will better fit what consumers would really
want if they could bargain for it.
On the other hand are sellers and creditors-equally well-intentioned-
who argue in good faith that these laws should not be enacted. The merchants
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and creditors make several arguments. First, they claim that the consumer
protection rules are costly and not efficient. These rules, particularly those in
Article 9, take money from the mass of consumers who never default and-so
the argument goes-give it to those who do. These creditors will claim that
Gail [illebrand]2 speaks only for the three percent who default; they will
argue that there is no evidence that the great mass of consumers wish to buy
insurance against an unlikely default. In sum the creditors will ask who is at
the table speaking for the ninety-seven percent who never default, but whose
money is taken because credit is more expensive to them. The creditors
maintain that the cost of that credit buys rights for the unworthy, the
dishonest, or at least for the small minority who are incapable or unwilling to
pay.
My basic point-a point I believe to be indisputable-is that honest and
principled persons are in deep disagreement about the justification for
introducing consumer protection rules in Articles 2 and 9. I make no claim
about which of these groups is correct; I claim only that there is an honest
division about what is right for society and an almost equally deep division
about what is right for consumers. It is my thesis that neither the
Commissioners nor the American Law Institute is a very effective body for
dealing with issues where there is such a deep and principled division of
opinion about what is good law.
In my opinion, the Commissioners work best when they are dealing with
intricate questions of law where there is wide agreement among all of the
participants on the basic social policy and where the job of the
Commissioners is merely to deal with second or third level social issues and
mostly with the technical questions concerning the drafting and the technical
operation of the law. Examples might be the commercial contract damage
provisions in Article 2' and the provisions for priority among secured
creditors in Article 9.4 These are the kind of intricate and important questions
that wise drafters can resolve. Neither of these touch on important social
policies in a fundamental way; neither generates the kind of anger and
firustration that consumer issues produce.
Let me explain why the system does not deal well with important issues of
social policy. First of all, NCCUSL exists to promote uniformity. The
2. Litigation Counsel, West Coast Regional Office, Consumers Union.
3. See U.C.C. §§ 2-701 to 2-719 (1995).
4. Seeid. §§9-311to9-316.
[VOL. 75:219
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss1/5
1997 AALS MEETING COMMENTS
Commissioners produce uniformity only by passage of law in fifty state
legislatures. If you tell the Commissioners that a law is not going to go
through fifteen of the state legislatures, or, for example, through New York or
Illinois or Texas, they will say to you, "We don't want to propose that law
because we don't want to produce nonuniformity."
The Commissioners have a much more difficult job than members of any
legislature. Their vote does not make anything law anywhere. Rather, to
accomplish their purpose they must make a guess about the probable response
of the state legislatures when those bodies are presented with the arguments
pro and con on the adoption of a uniform law. Unlike the Congress or state
legislature, where even a close vote of 51-49 resolves things irrevocably, the
Commissioners' vote resolves nothing. That vote must be taken with an eye
to the state legislatures and long and harsh experience has taught the
Commissioners that their power is limited.
In most cases the size and power of the constituencyfor the adoption of
uniform law is hard to underestimate. Consider, for example, Articles 3 and 4
where revisions were proposed in 1990. The revisions made comparatively
modest changes in the existing law, but, ultimately, they attracted the
opposition of two persons at this table-Ed Rubin and Gail Hillebrand. Sweet
Ed Rubin, a professor of law at Berkeley, was able to keep Article 3 from
being adopted in several states for a couple of years merely by writing a letter
to some of the legislators. By doing a little eleventh hour whining in the
California legislature, Gail was able to keep Article 3 from being adopted for
more than a year.
I do not use this example to exaggerate the power of a law professor to
keep something from being adopted, but the reverse. I take it as a given that
law professors have little or no influence on any legislation in most
circumstances. That Ed-a law professor from infamous Berkeley-was
capable of slowing Article 3 shows not that he is powerful, but that the
pressure for its adoption is weak. Because she speaks for the Consumers
Union, Gail, of course, has more influence than any law professor, but as I
understand it, even her push against Article 3 was modest and undertaken at
the eleventh hour. It is a bitter truth that the push for adoption of any revision
of any of the Articles of the Uniform Commercial Code is so modest that it is
possible for even weak and disorganized opposition to hold up or even
stalemate their adoption in many of the state legislatures.
Ask yourself who wants a revision of Article 2 or Article 9. Who is dying
for this? The answer, I think, is nobody. As a member of the Study
Committee (to recommend whether Article 2 be revised or not) I saw
1997]
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considerable feeling that Article 2 should not be revised. To my knowledge
no industry association, bar group, or other association is clamoring for the
modification of Article 2 or Article 9.
If one accepts my hypothesis, no one is willing to spend a substantial
amount of legislative capital to get Article 2 or Article 9 adopted, yet any
significant consumer additions to or subtractions from either Article will
produce at least moderately determined opposition. So what are the probable
results when this confrontation between the consumer advocates and the
merchants and creditors comes to a head in the next year?
One possibility is that the Commissioners successfully broker a deal
between the creditors and debtors and successfully engineer a fifty state
adoption that is more or less uniform. As I suggested above, I do not think
this will happen unless the revisions hew quite closely to the existing law.
The omission of existing consumer protection or the addition of significant
new consumer protection is likely to stand in the way of adoption because of
the opposition of one of the opposing groups.
The second possibility is that the whole process aborts. The abortion
model is the "3, 4, 8" project, a proposal for a large-some would say
radical-change that would have taken the place of Articles 3, 4, and 8. When
after several drafts the Commissioners concluded that the bankers' opposition
would keep the 3, 4, 8 proposal from being adopted, they canceled the
proposal.
I suppose the worst of all possible outcomes is "high centering"; high
centering occurs when you are driving a truck or a car on a deeply rutted road
and the car gets hung up on its frame. High centering is to get revised Articles
2 and 9 through twenty legislatures and then to get stuck. If that happens, we
have Article 9 in one version in twenty states and a different Article 9 in thirty
other states-for the rest of our lives. That too is possible.
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code high centered. It was passed in about
a dozen states and then got stuck. If the truth were known, high centering is
probably the most common historical outcome of uniform laws. In fact, the
very first law proposed by the Commissioners, having to do with marriage
and divorce, passed in only one or two states. You would be surprised to hear
the list of uniform laws that have been proposed for uniform adoption but
have been adopted only in a handful of states. The Commissioners, of course,
are more keenly aware of this possibility than you or I, and we can expect
them to labor mightily to keep this result from happening.
What are the most likely results? In Article 2 the most likely outcome is
something that hews to the status quo in existing Article 2. Whether that is
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satisfactory to Gail and her consumer colleagues remains to be seen. My
guess is that Gail does not have the political power to get much more than
that from the Article 2 people. The car manufacturers and the car dealers have
just sent out a letter that challenges the current draft of Article 2. It explicitly
threatens a campaign in the state legislatures against Article 2. I would guess
that one car dealer in the state of Illinois has more power than all the law
professors in this room combined, so the manufacturers and dealers make a
plausible threat and the Commissioners will understand that.
With Article 9 1 think the odds are pretty fair either that we will get a
stalemate between the consumer creditors and Gail's people or that we will
have a series of alternatives. I do not know how Gall or the consumer
creditors will respond to the alternatives. In other words, the draft might have
Alternative A which will say "in case of failure to sell in a commercially
reasonable manner, no deficiency".. . and Alternative B "in case of failure to
sell in a commercially reasonable manner, only damages proved by the
debtor." You will have a series of creditor and debtor alternatives.
Alternatives shift the fight to the state legislatures. Right? It means that Gail
has to travel all over the country (something she does not want to do) and the
consumer creditors have to mount an attack in every state. So it is conceivable
that either side at that point would say to the Commissioners that if that is
what you are going to do, we do not want anything. And "we do not want
anything" of course is a plausible outcome here because there is nothing too
badly wrong with Articles 9 or 2.
Whether we eventually get consensus on a revision, no revision, or a
flawed revision that high centers, this is an interesting political process--one
you should follow as closely as you can. There is a reasonable possibility that
we have come upon two parts of the law that will defeat this process. We will
see.
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